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PRICE SCISSORS AND THE STRUCTURE OF 
THE ECONOMY* 
RAAJ KUMAR SAH AND JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ 
This paper undertakes three sets of tasks: (i) it analyzes positive and normative 
aspects of price scissors (the domestic terms of trade between agriculture and 
industry) within nonsocialist as well as socialist LDCs. The critical role of the 
economy's institutional features (e.g., external trade environment, wage and income 
determination, and wage-productivity effects) is emphasized. Certain aspects of the 
Soviet Industrialization Debate and subsequent collectivization are interpreted. (ii) 
It develops simple rules to delineate who gains and who loses (within agriculture) 
from changes in terms of trade. (iii) It presents powerful (and informationally 
parsimonious) rules for Pareto-improving price reforms for cash crops and agricul- 
tural inputs. 
A basic problem faced by the early Soviet state was how best to 
raise the funds required if rapid capital accumulation was to be 
achieved. To what extent should the burden be placed on the 
peasants, by lowering the prices they receive for their output 
(relative to the prices of industrial goods), and to what extent 
should the burden be placed on the industrial proletariat? This 
question of the appropriate domestic terms of trade between the 
urban and rural sectors (the price scissors) was pivotal in the Soviet 
Industrialization Debate (1924-1928). The same question has been 
intensely debated in the People's Republic of China in recent years, 
with a widespread view that (to use the economists' language) the 
rural sector was too heavily taxed during the Cultural Revolution 
and its aftermath, and that both sectors could be made better off by 
reducing the size of the scissors. In fact, the question of the 
appropriate terms of trade has turned out to be central to most less 
developed countries (LDCs), whether socialist or not, simply 
because this question represents a fundamental tradeoff in the 
initial phases of development in economies in which agriculture 
plays an important role. 
The first objective of this paper, therefore, is to analyze the 
incidence of the terms of trade (that is, the consequences of 
changing the terms of trade on those in the rural sector, on those in 
the urban sector, and on the investable surplus), to examine what a 
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government can or cannot accomplish through its attempts to alter 
the terms of trade, to identify qualitative properties of the optimal 
terms of trade, and to relate all of the preceding to the institutional 
features of the economy. 
Among the institutional features of the economy that we 
emphasize in this paper are the international trade environment 
faced by the country, the nature of the mechanisms that determine 
wages and earnings (and the government's role in wage determina- 
tion), and the nature of wage-productivity effects (that is, the 
consequences of changes in prices and wages on the net productivity 
of workers). LDCs display an enormous range concerning these 
features; our approach here is to formulate a general model that is 
then specialized to analyze the positive and normative aspects of 
the terms of trade under various stylized assumptions concerning 
these institutional features. 
For example, we posit that in a socialist economy, the govern- 
ment has the prerogative of setting the industrial wage. In contrast, 
in most nonsocialist LDCs, private firms and trade unions (which, 
in some cases, represent a privileged class of blue-collar workers) 
play a major role in industrial wage determination. Thus, not only is 
the level of industrial wage endogenous, but also it is sensitive to the 
prices that the industrial workforce faces. We therefore employ a 
general (reduced-form) formulation for urban wage determination; 
this can be specialized to hypotheses which postulate that the urban 
wage is fixed in terms of food or the industrial good, as well as to 
other (more plausible) hypotheses. The analysis of corresponding 
induced incidences of price changes is one of the important 
elements of the present study. 
Similarly, whether LDCs should be viewed as open or closed 
economies has long been debated. What is critical for an analysis of 
the terms of trade, however, is not the level of trade (say relative to 
the national income) but the ability of the economy to change the 
level of trade at the margin. We show, for example, that if the 
external trade cannot be changed at the margin (for instance, 
because the demand for the country's exports is very inelastic in the 
short run, or because the country faces constraints in the interna- 
tional credit market which limit its ability to trade), and if the 
government does not have a direct control over the industrial wage 
(as is the case in nonsocialist LDCs), then the government has no 
ability to change the terms of trade. In a socialist economy, on the 
other hand, the terms of trade can be altered, but such changes 
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must be accompanied by specific changes in the industrial wage.1 
By contrast, if the economy is open at the margin, then there is 
additional flexibility in the economy. This, as we shall see, has 
important implications for the consequences of alternative terms of 
trade policies. 
The analysis outlined above is presented in two sections. In 
Section I the focus is on an LDC with a mixed (nonsocialist) 
economy; whereas a socialist economy is considered in Section II. In 
the latter section we also use our analysis to interpret certain 
aspects of the Soviet Industrialization Debate and the subsequent 
collectivization. 
Another objective of this paper is to address two issues of vital 
interest to LDCs today. The first issue concerns the intrasectoral 
distributional consequences of the terms of trade: which groups in 
the agricultural sector (landless workers, or landlords, for example) 
are helped or hurt by a movement of the terms of trade against, or in 
favor of, agriculture? This question has been a source of debate in 
many LDCs.2 In Section III we delineate simple conditions to 
determine who gains and who loses from a change in the terms of 
trade. We show that under plausible circumstances, a movement in 
the terms of trade against (in favor of) agriculture hurts (helps) 
everyone in this sector, whether rich or poor. 
The second issue concerns controversial questions such as 
whether tractors should be taxed and fertilizers subsidized; more 
generally, how should the taxes and subsidies on different agricul- 
tural inputs and outputs be set? The answer, as one would expect, 
depends in part on the social welfare function, because changes in 
the prices of different goods have different distributional conse- 
quences. But since agreements on social weights are difficult to 
achieve among policy makers and government officials, it is impor- 
tant to identify reforms that make the society better-off without 
hurting anyone. We have developed here Pareto-improving rules 
for reform in the prices of cash crops (sugar cane and cotton, for 
example) and agricultural inputs (fertilizer and tractors, for exam- 
ple). These reforms have the further advantage in being parsimo- 
nious in the information required to implement them. Our reform 
1. In an earlier paper [Sah and Stiglitz, 1984] we emphasized this case (that is, a 
closed socialist economy) and abstracted from wage-productivity effects. 
2. In India, for instance, Mitra [1977] has argued that higher agricultural prices 
have a deleterious distributional effect; whereas Kalhon and Tyagi [1980] have 
argued that the opposite is the case. 
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analysis also suggests that there is a case against taxing some cash 
crops and agricultural inputs, while subsidizing others. The above 
rules of reform are developed and analyzed in Section IV. Some of 
the possible extensions of the analysis in this paper are briefly 
discussed in the concluding section. 
I. PRICE SCISSORS IN A MIXED ECONOMY 
In this section we describe the basic model of the economy, 
analyze the effects of changes in the terms of trade, and interpret 
the qualitative properties of the optimal terms of trade. The model 
consists of two aggregate sectors, each producing a single aggregate 
good. The individuals within each sector are assumed to be homoge- 
neous. The government controls, at most, the nominal price of the 
industrial good, through which it attempts to alter the terms of 
trade.3 (In the model of a socialist economy considered in the next 
section, the government can exercise a direct control over the urban 
wage. The intrasectoral heterogeneity among individuals is intro- 
duced in Section III. The model is further extended in Section IV to 
incorporate a multitude of goods produced in each of the two 
sectors.) 
A. The Model 
Agricultural Sector. The rural and urban populations are 
denoted by N1 and N2.4 A is the total agricultural land owned 
equally by homogeneous peasants. The output of the agricultural 
good per peasant is X = X(A/N1, L1), and L1 is the variable number 
of hours a peasant works. (x1, y1) denote a peasant's consumption of 
the agricultural and industrial goods. Q = X - x1 > 0, is the surplus 
of the agricultural good per peasant. p represents the terms of 
trade, that is, the price of the agricultural good in terms of the 
(numeraire) industrial good. A peasant's budget constraint is 
(1) pQ ==y. 
If a peasant's indirect utility is denoted by V1 (p), then from Roy's 
identity, V1/8p = 1Q > 0, where X" is the positive marginal utility 
of income of a person in sector i. EQp = a In Q/8 In p is the elasticity 
3. Note here that the long-standing debates on price scissors (as well as the 
present analysis) are based on the assumption that the government cannot (does not) 
set two different sets of prices in the two sectors. This assumption may not be 
appropriate for some LDCs, like India and South Korea. Additional policy instru- 
ments, including differential pricing in the two sectors, are discussed later. 
4. The superscripts 1 and 2 denote the agricultural and industrial sectors. 
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of surplus per peasant with respect to its price. We assume that this 
elasticity is positive. 
Industrial Sector. An industrial worker's consumption is 
denoted by (x2, y2), and his wage rate and (fixed) labor hours are w 
and L2, respectively.5 A worker's budget constraint is 
(2) pX2 + y2 = wL2. 
If V2 (p, w) denotes the indirect utility of an urban worker, then 
aV2/8p =-X2x2, and 8V2/8 w = X2L2. m = wL2 denotes a worker's 
income, and E2 = -8 In x2/8 in p and (2m = a In x2/8 In m denote, 
respectively, the elasticities of his consumption of the agricultural 
good with respect to price and income. These elasticities are 
positive, since consumption goods are assumed to be normal. The 
output of an industrial worker is denoted by Y. It depends on the 
current capital stock per worker, k, and the labor hours per worker, 
L. . 
Wage-Productivity Effects. Wage-productivity effects have 
been typically studied in the literature in an environment of fixed 
prices. A natural generalization in the context of changing prices is 
the reduced-form expression: 
(3) Y= Y(k,L 2, p, W), 
where the last two arguments capture the effects of prices and 
wages on the net output of an industrial worker.6 For later use, 
define two numbers, 0m = (8Y/8w) (1/L2) and cp -(8Y/8p) (l/x2), 
to denote productivity gains from an increase in wage income and a 
reduction in the terms of trade. 
Whether an increase in p increases or decreases productivity 
cannot be predicted without additional restrictions.7 We consider 
here two representative specifications: (i) productivity depends on, 
and increases with, the level of utility; that is, Y = Y(k, L2, 
V2 (p, w)). In this case, urp = 0m > 0. (ii) Productivity depends on, 
and increases with, the consumption of food (agricultural good); 
5. The analysis corresponding to variable labor hours of industrial workers can 
be easily worked out. 
6. In Sah and Stiglitz [1985a] we show how a reduced-form wage-productivity 
representation such as (3) can be specialized to specific hypotheses that relate the 
net output of workers to labor efficiency, labor quality, and labor turnover. For 
economic motivations that underlie each of these hypotheses, see Stiglitz [1982], 
Yellen [1984], and references therein. 
7. For instance, suppose that the productivity is increasing in the consumption 
quantities of various goods. Then an increase in the price of one good increases the 
consumption of some goods (gross substitutes) and reduces the consumption of other 
goods (gross complements). The overall effect of a price change on productivity, 
therefore, cannot be predicted in general. 
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that is, Y = Y(k, L2, x2 (p, w)). In this case, a > m > 0.8 The latter 
specification can be seen as a polar case of the view that productiv- 
ity is "more" sensitive to food consumption than to the consump- 
tion of other goods. 
Equilibrium. Since the government in a mixed economy does 
not control the urban wage, the urban wage is in general affected by 
the prices that urban workers face. We begin with the reduced-form 
representation: 
(4) w = w(p). 
As we shall see, this formulation is consistent with several alterna- 
tive hypotheses concerning how the urban wage is determined; 
moreover, this formulation has the advantage of identifying the 
central implications of the endogeneity of the urban wage. 
If T. and T, denote the net imports of the two goods, then trade 
balance implies that T, = -PT,, where P is the (fixed) international 
price of the agricultural good. The investable surplus is I = N2 y _ 
N1yl N2y2 - PT,. Substitution of (1) and (2) in the preceding 
expression yields 
(5) I = N2 (y _ wL2) + p(N2x2 - N1Q) - PTX. 
The quantity balance of the agricultural good is represented by 
(6) N1Q(p ) + T, = N2x2 (p, w). 
It is apparent that if the economy faces binding trade 
constraints; that is, if the quantity T. cannot be changed at the 
margin (a special case of this is a closed mixed economy, where T. = 
0), then the equilibrium prices and wage, (p, w), are determined by 
(4) and (6), and the government's attempts to alter the terms of 
trade (by changing the nominal price of the industrial good) have no 
effect on this equilibrium.9 Thus, 
PROPOSITION 1. The terms of trade cannot be altered in a mixed 
economy that faces constraints in external trade. 
The government may not be aware of its inability to alter the 
terms of trade, and it may attempt to do so, but such attempts 
8. up _ a"m = (dY/ax2) q'u/p, where 2u denotes the own price elasticity of the 
compensated food consumption of an industrial worker. To avoid trivial details, we 
assume that there is some substitution possibility in consumption; that is, tpU > 0. 
9. Except in the implausible case where the urban wage adjusts to clear the 
market for the agricultural good (see expression (6)) for any level of p that the 
government might attempt to set. Such a response of the urban wage to prices means, 
in effect, that the government directly controls the urban wage. We analyze this case 
in Section II, in the context of a socialist economy. 
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cannot be successful. In the rest of this section, therefore, we 
consider a mixed economy facing no trade constraints. Accordingly, 
(6) is substituted into (5) to obtain 
(7) I =N2 (Y - wL2) + (p - P) (N2 x2 - N1Q). 
B. Effect of Price Scissors on the Investable Surplus 
The terms of trade has a direct influence on the investable 
surplus, and an indirect influence through the induced effect on the 
urban wage. That is, 
dI AI dw AI (8) dp =p dp Ow 
Before we study the combined effect, however, it is instructive to 
look at the separate effects that the terms of trade and the urban 
wage have on the investable surplus. We begin with the former. 
The partial derivative of (7) with respect to p can be 
rearranged to yield 
(9) 2L = N2x2 [0 - s{(1 - 0) (Q + ( 2PI - 07 
where 0 = TJN2 x2 is the net import of the agricultural good as a 
fraction of its consumption in the industrial sector. A negative 
(positive) 0 implies that the country exports (imports) the agricul- 
tural good. Also, 1 > 0, from (6) and from Q > 0. s = (p - P)/p 
represents the tax or subsidy rate on the agricultural good. A 
negative (positive) s implies that the peasants are being taxed 
(subsidized); whereas the industrial workers are being subsidized 
(taxed). 
The three distinct ways in which the terms of trade affects the 
investable surplus can be seen in the three terms within the square 
brackets in the right-hand side of (9). First, a higher p increases or 
decreases the tariff revenue from the current external trade 
depending on whether the country is an importer or an exporter of 
the agricultural good. Second, a higher p lowers the net import of 
the agricultural good (because the rural surplus is raised and the 
urban consumption is lowered); consequently, the tariff revenue 
increases or decreases depending on whether p is smaller or larger 
than P. Third, a higher p reduces the investable surplus because of 
its negative effect on productivity. 
The effect of a change in urban wage on the investable surplus 
is represented by the partial derivative of (7) with respect to w. This 
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derivative can be rearranged as 
(10) = N2L2 (-1 + Sc446em + C7m) 8w 
where a' = px2/m is an industrial worker's budget share on the 
agricultural good. Once again, the right-hand side of (10) is easily 
interpreted. A higher urban wage leads to a direct reduction in the 
profit from industry which reduces the investable surplus; a higher 
urban wage increases the consumption of the rural good by indus- 
trial workers which, in turn, increases or decreases the tariff 
revenue depending on whether p is larger or smaller than P; and a 
higher urban wage raises the investable surplus by raising the 
productivity of urban workers. 
To analyze the overall effect of altering the terms of trade on 
the investable surplus, we combine (9) and (10), using (8), to 
obtain 
(11) dI= N2x2[{(1 - 0) + (ua -m) + 7(1 -7m)} dp 
+ s {(1 - 0) e( + (2u pca2E}] 
where E2 =E2 - 2 E2m > 0 is the own compensated price elasticity of 
the food consumption of an urban worker, sCp = a In w/8 In p is the 
elasticity of the urban wage with respect to price, and p = - 1 + 
(wp/ax is a summary parameter representing the urban wage 
schedule. 
We focus here on the urban wage determination hypothesis 
according to which the urban wage adjusts, in the face of changing 
prices, to preserve the welfare of urban workers; that is, the urban 
wage is determined from 
(12) V2 (p, w) = V2 
where V2 is a parameter. This wage schedule is consistent with a 
setting where the urban wage is determined through a bargaining 
between the government and a trade union, and the union does not 
suffer from money illusion; that is, the union understands how the 
welfare of its members is affected by changes in the wage and prices. 
We also point out how the qualitative insights obtained from the 
above wage determination hypothesis can be extended to other, less 
plausible, hypotheses that have been employed in development 
economics. 
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Expression (12) yields p = 0. Substituting this into (11), we 
obtain 
(13) d- 0 if p 5 p*, where p* < P. dp 
Specifically, 
(14) P P ~ (1-Q)( XP2 (14) P* = P (1-0) (1 + El ) + E2? + (ap am) 
and it is obvious from (14) that p is smaller than P. We have thus 
shown 
PROPOSITION 2. When the welfare of industrial workers is preserved 
at some given level, then a decrease (increase) in the terms of 
trade increases the investable surplus if the existing terms of 
trade is above (below) a critical level p*, which is below the 
international relative price.10 
It also follows from (13) that p* is the level of terms of trade at 
which the investable surplus is maximized." 
C. Welfare Effects'2 
Recall that a lower terms of trade hurts the peasants. Since the 
welfare of urban workers is unaffected by a change in the terms of 
10. This result holds for some other wage determination hypotheses as well; 
obviously, the critical level p* would be different for different hypotheses. Consider 
the food-wage hypothesis under which the urban wage is fixed in terms of food. Then 
f, = 1, and p = (1 - a')/a'. Using this, we can verify from (11) that sufficient 
conditions for (13) to hold are that (a) 1 > am; that is, the wage-productivity effects 
are not too large (specifically, a dollar increase in an urban worker's income yields no 
more than a dollar increase in his net output), and (b) an urban worker's food 
consumption is nonincreasing in food price (which means that the substitution effect 
of a price change dominates the income effect; that is, c' - (xm). Next consider the 
polar opposite hypothesis under which the urban wage is fixed in terms of the 
industrial good. In this case, kip = 0, 5 = -1, and (11) shows that a sufficient 
condition for (13) to hold is that 0 < 0; that is, the country is a net exporter of the 
agricultural good (which is what we would expect in a typical LDC). 
11. Dixit and Stern [1974] have studied the investment-maximizing price under 
the food-wage hypothesis (described in footnote 10), but their model is a highly 
special case of ours. They assume that the hours of work for a peasant are fixed and 
equal to the work hours for an industrial worker, the urban wage equals the fixed 
food output of a peasant, and there are no wage-productivity effects. That is, X and 
Y are fixed; wL = pX; x' = x2. Substitution of these into (7) yields I = N2 
(Y - PX) - (p - P) (N' + N2)Q. These assumptions, in effect, reduce a two-sector 
economy to a single-sector economy consisting of homogeneous individuals. The 
derivative of I with respect to p yields the corresponding result: p* = PI(1 4- 1i/Q 
12. The results in this subsection are based on the urban wage schedule (f2). 
See Sah and Stiglitz [1985b] for an analysis of welfare effects under other wage 
determination hypotheses. 
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trade, according to (12), the following result is immediate from 
(13). 
PROPOSITION 3. Any price below p* is Pareto inefficient. 
In other words, regardless of whether the government cares 
about peasants or not, and regardless of how pampered or impover- 
ished the urban workers might be compared with the peasants, both 
the investable surplus as well as the welfare of peasants suffer if the 
terms of trade is reduced below certain levels. 
How high the terms of trade should be depends on how the 
society trades off its desire for accumulation against the welfare of 
peasants. To examine this tradeoff, we now turn to a normative 
analysis in which the current value of the discounted aggregate 
social welfare is represented by the Hamiltonian, 
(15) H=0 + ? , 
where I is given by (7), 6 denotes the (positive) social value of the 
marginal investable surplus, and 0 = N1W' (V1) + N' W2(V2) is an 
additive social welfare function.'3 Since V2 is fixed, dH/dp = N x2 
(1 - 0)f' + bdI/dp, in which Oi = XdW/O V' denotes the social 
weight on the marginal income of an individual in sector i, and 
dI/dp is given by (11), where p = 0. We equate dH/dp to zero and 
obtain the following interior characterization of the optimal terms 
of trade: 
(16) S ( 
_ )El + ,2u 7 
where the ratio of social weights f1/6 represents the society's 
tradeoff between the investable surplus and the welfare of peasants. 
Recalling that 1 > 0, and op: o 0m, expression (16) yields the following 
result. 
PROPOSITION 4. (i) Peasants are taxed if the social weight on their 
income is smaller than that on the investable surplus. (ii) 
Peasants are subsidized if the social weight on their income is 
larger than that on the investable surplus, and if wage- 
productivity effects are not significant.'4 
13. If the welfare function is anonymous between rural and urban individuals, 
then the functions W1 and W2 are the same. 
14. In fact, this result holds even if wage-productivity effects are significant, 
provided that they depend on a worker's level of utility. 
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II. PRICE SCISSORS IN A SOCIALIST ECONOMY: THE SOVIET 
DEBATE AND COLLECTIVIZATION 
Our objectives in this section are to recast the preceding analysis 
in the context of a socialist economy where the government exer- 
cises a direct control over the urban wage and, then, to relate this 
analysis to certain aspects of the Soviet debate and collectivization. 
A central consequence of the government's ability to control the 
urban wage is that, unlike in the case of a mixed economy, a socialist 
government can alter the terms of trade even if the external trade is 
constrained. If there are no constraints on external trade, on the 
other hand, then a socialist government can set the terms of trade 
and the urban wage independently of one another. We begin with 
the analysis of the latter case. 
A. An Open Economy 
Since the government can choose w and p independently of one 
another, the natural benchmark is the one where the government 
chooses a level of welfare for urban workers."5 Thus, Propositions 2 
to 4, and related results, hold in the present situation as well, 
because these results do not depend on what the level of an urban 
worker's welfare is, or on how this level is determined. 
To examine the tradeoffs involved in the determination of the 
urban workers' level of welfare, we consider the interior maximum 
of (15) with respect to the urban wage w. Equating aHiaw to zero, 
we obtain 
(1 )2/6 = I _ am _ S 2mx2 
The above, in combination with (16), characterizes the socially 
optimal (p, w) which in turn yield the optimal level of welfare for 
urban workers. 
Intuitively, one would expect the optimal urban wage (and the 
resulting welfare of urban workers) to be sensitive to how much the 
society cares about future consumption (the investable surplus) 
versus the present consumption. In the extreme case of an invest- 
ment-maximizing society (that is, 3'/6 0), s is negative from (16) 
15. If the socialist government follows some other urban wage schedule (for 
example, keeping the urban wage fixed in terms of one of the two goods), then 
footnote 10 applies here as well. But the rationale for making such an assumption for 
a socialist government is even weaker than that for a government in a mixed economy 
because the former can choose a wage schedule, whereas the latter faces a wage 
schedule. 
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and, therefore, Yam > 1, from (17). That is, the wage and prices faced 
by industrial workers in an investment-maximizing socialist econ- 
omy are such that an increase in their wage would increase their net 
output more than proportionately."6 
The above result may appear somewhat counterintuitive 
because the society should be willing to increase the industrial wage 
if it can recover, through increased productivity, more than what it 
paid. The reason why this is not true is that a higher industrial wage 
also increases the food consumption of industrial workers. This, in 
turn, leads to a loss in the public revenue because the optimal p is 
lower than P. This indirect revenue loss makes it undesirable for an 
investment-maximizing society to take full advantage of the pro- 
ductivity gains from increasing the industrial wage. 
B. An Economy Closed at the Margin 
If the traded quantities are fixed at the margin, that is, if T, 
and Ty are fixed, then a change in terms of trade must be accompa- 
nied by a particular change in the urban wage, to maintain the 
quantity balance (6) in the market for the agricultural good. If Esp = 
d in w/d in p represents this change in wage, in an elasticity form, 
then a perturbation in (6) shows that 
(18) sap 
= 
[(1 - 0)Ep + Ep > 0. 
It is also evident from the above expression that cw is larger if E' is 
larger, or if 0 is smaller. Thus, 
PROPOSITION 5. In a socialist economy with constraints on traded 
quantities, a decrease in the terms of trade must be accompa- 
nied by a particular reduction in the urban wage. Further, the 
reduction in the urban wage is larger if the peasants' surplus 
elasticity is larger, or if the net import of the agricultural good 
is smaller in relation to its urban consumption. 
The underlying reason is simple. Lowering the terms of trade 
leads to a smaller supply of rural -surplus and a larger urban food 
demand. To balance the demand and supply, therefore, the urban 
wage must be reduced. Further, the urban wage must adjust more, 
the greater is the sensitivity of the rural surplus supply to the terms 
of trade. 
The industrial workers thus face a lower price, but also a lower 
16. If there are no wage-productivity effects, and if investment is being 
maximized, then it is easily verified that (15) does not have an interior optimum with 
respect to w; the optimal wage in this case equals the minimum feasible level. 
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wage, when the terms of trade are lowered. However, the required 
lowering of the urban wage always turns out to be sufficiently large 
that the urban workers become worse-off. To see this, calculate 
dV2 aV2 aV2dw 
dp ap aw dp 
which can be expressed as d V2/dp = X2x2p, where p = -1 + Plx. 
Using (18), note that p = [(1 - + E2I/Il2Em > 0, and hence, 
d V2/dp > 0. This result should not be surprising. With a lower price 
the rural surplus is lower, and at any given level of welfare of urban 
workers, the urban consumption is higher. Hence, to reduce urban 
food consumption, the welfare of urban workers must be reduced. 
The impact of the terms of trade on the investable surplus is 
also easily analyzed. Lowering the terms of trade implies lowering 
the urban wage which, in turn, increases the investable surplus. The 
effect on productivity, however, is ambiguous, since a lower food 
price increases productivity; whereas a lower urban wage decreases 
productivity. The total effect can be obtained from (8), where (18) 
gives the change in wage and, from (5) and (6), the investment is 
given by I = N2(Y - wL2) + (p - P)TX. This yields 
dp 
Thus, a sufficient condition for a lowering of p to raise the 
investable surplus is 1 - _ (m; that is, a dollar increase in the income 
of an industrial worker raises his net output by no more than a 
dollar. But, clearly, (19) will be negative so long as a-m is not too large 
compared with one. These results are summarized below. 
PROPOSITION 6. In a socialist economy with constraints on traded 
quantities, a decrease in the terms of trade (i) hurts peasants as 
well as industrial workers, and (ii) increases investment, pro- 
vided that wage-productivity effects are not too significant.17 
17. Also, recall the definition of p, and observe that it is clear from (19) that, if 
am - 1 then the absolute value of the right-hand side of (19) is larger if ,Qp is larger. 
That is, the response of the investable surplus to a change in the terms of trade is 
larger if peasants' surplus is more price elastic. This should not be surprising, since in 
the present case a reduction in the terms of trade necessitates a larger decrease in the 
urban wage. Parallel conclusions need not always hold, however, when external trade 
is unconstrained. As (11) shows, whether dI/dp increases or decreases with (Q 
depends on whether peasants are being taxed or subsidized. 
Further, it is easy to verify that the qualitative properties of the optimal terms 
of trade continue to be described by (16) and (17), provided that the tax or subsidy is 
now defined with respect to the appropriate shadow price; that is, if s = (p - qlb)lp, 
where ij/6 is the shadow price of the agricultral good in terms of the industrial good. 
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C. The Soviet Debate 
The Soviet Industrialization Debate (1924-1928) is important, 
despite its polemics, because it anticipated some of the difficult but 
central tradeoffs that confront many of today's developing econo- 
mies. The overemphasis in this debate on the price squeeze of 
peasants as a source of the investable surplus, and the underempha- 
sis on the possible increase in the investable surplus through a wage 
squeeze of the proletariat may not be surprising, given the pro- 
proletariat bias of the early Soviet state. Among the positive issues 
that received insufficient attention in this debate, but that turn out 
to be central according to our analysis, are the incentives of 
peasants and proletariat, and the general equilibrium effects of the 
terms of trade. 
Our main interest here is to use our analysis to clarify a "law" 
and some of the propositions advanced by Evgeny Preobrazhensky 
[1965] in the Soviet Debate. Specifically he proposed that (i) the 
state can increase capital accumulation by turning the terms of 
trade against peasants, and (ii) this can be done without hurting the 
proletariat.18 In an earlier paper [1984] we referred to the above as 
Preobrazhensky's first and second propositions, respectively. Using 
our notations, we can rephrase these as (i) dI/dp < 0, and (ii) 
dV2/dp -z 0, while dI/dp < 0. The second proposition is simply a 
stronger version of the first because it claims not only that the state 
can increase the investable surplus by lowering the terms of trade, 
but also that the state can preserve (if not improve) the welfare of 
the proletariat in this process. 
If the economy faces constraints in external trade, then the 
second proposition is invalid; whereas the first proposition is likely 
to be valid within a large range of terms of trade (see our Proposi- 
tion 6). The first proposition may, however, be reversed at low levels 
of urban wages if a reduction in the terms of trade (and the 
corresponding reduction in the urban wage) leads, through wage- 
productivity effects, to significantly large reduction in the net 
output of the proletariat. The economy obviously has a greater 
flexibility if its external trade is unconstrained. In this case, as our 
Proposition 2 shows, the second proposition of Preobrazhensky is 
18. Besides the terms of trade, Preobrazhensky discussed many other instru- 
ments of policy, such as railroad tariffs, printing money, credit policy, etc. The 
centerpiece of his verbal analysis, as well as that of his critics, is the terms of trade, on 
which we have focused here. 
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valid if the current terms of trade is above certain levels, and it is 
invalid otherwise.19 
Preobrazhensky [1965, p. 124] also advanced what he called the 
Fundamental Law of Primitive Socialist Accumulation: "... the 
smaller the inheritance received by the socialist accumulation fund 
of the proletariat ... when the social revolution takes place, by so 
much the more, in proportion, will socialist accumulation be obliged 
to rely on alienating part of the surplus product of presocialist forms 
of economy and the smaller will be the relative weight of accumula- 
tion on its own production basis; that is, the less will it be nourished 
by the surplus product of the workers in socialist industry." 
This "law" appears to claim that a lower current capital stock 
in industry (a) necessitates the state to put a greater price squeeze 
on peasants, and (b) implies that the profit from the industrial 
sector would be a smaller fraction of the total investable surplus. 
For brevity, we shall refer to the above as Preobrazhensky's third 
and fourth propositions, respectively. Within our model a smaller 
current capital stock would imply a larger value of the social weight 
on investment, 8. With this interpretation the third proposition is 
correct in the sense that the optimal terms of trade would tend to be 
lower if 8 is higher (see expression (16), for example). But what this 
proposition does not recognize is that a price squeeze on peasants 
beyond some level is counterproductive regardless of the capital 
stock. 
The fourth proposition is also partly correct in the sense that, 
at given wages and prices, a lower capital stock means that the 
industrial profit is smaller, and so is the proportion of the total 
investable surplus coming from industry. However, if the state is 
willing to trade off the current welfare of the proletariat against its 
desire for rapid accumulation, then a larger 8 may also imply a lower 
welfare of the proletariat (principally, though a reduction in their 
19. Though it is peripheral to the present analysis, a question that might be of 
interest is whether an economy with or without constraints on external trade is a 
more appropriate specification to understand Preobrazhensky's propositions, and 
which one of the above two specifications is a better representation of the Soviet 
economy before the debate, that is, during 1918-1924. Our own view (summarized in 
Sah and Stiglitz [1986]) is that the facts concerning the Soviet Union during this 
period (such as the trade embargoes and interruptions, and the external credit 
constraints imposed upon the Soviets) and the understanding that the participants 
in the Soviet debate had of these facts (for example, the fear of "capitalist 
encirclement") suggest that, in stylized models such as those being discussed here, a 
specification with constraints on external trade is more plausible than the one 
without any constraint. For an opposite view see Carter [1986]. 
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wages) and, in this case, it is not necessary for industrial profits to 
behave the way hypothesized in the fourth proposition. 
D. Collectivization 
Our analysis shows that there is a limit to how low the prices to 
peasants should be pushed, regardless of whether the state cares for 
them or not, and there is a corresponding limit to how large a 
surplus can be extracted from peasants. If a state wants to extract 
more surplus than this, then it must discover some alternative way 
of organizing the rural sector. One can interpret the Soviet collectiv- 
ization as a response to these problems. That is, collectivization was 
viewed by the Soviet leadership as an organizational alternative 
which would allow a significantly larger surplus extraction from the 
rural sector, enabling not only a faster accumulation of capital 
(deemed by early Soviet leaders to be urgently needed) but also a 
betterment of the proletariat.20 
In other words, collectivization can be viewed as a substitution 
of a supervisory-command system for a price-incentive system. Some 
aspects of the comparison between the two systems (such as the 
workers' incentives to shirk under the former) have been extensively 
studied. Here, we would like to raise an aspect that has received 
insufficient attention. Most of the literature has focused on a 
comparison of the ability of alternative organizations to induce 
workers to achieve certain work norms. But a critical problem, 
particularly in agriculture (where there are wide variations in the 
quality of land from plot to plot, and in the climatic conditions from 
season to season), is the setting of norms. What "should" be the 
output from a plot of land? How much work is "reasonable" to expect 
from someone? When individuals work on their own plots, they set 
the norms for themselves. Also, supervisory systems may work better 
in a competitive environment because workers can then choose 
among a variety of farms, where differences in pay may correspond to 
differences in work norms. But, there is virtually no endogenous 
basis for norm determination in a collective economy.21 
20. This, of course, is a purely "economic" interpretation. At the other extreme, 
one can argue that the reasons for collectivization were entirely "non-economic," 
such as the commitment of the Soviet state to destroy the power of potentially 
reactionary peasantry, or simply to abolish private property. 
21. This analysis also suggests that productivity in collectives may decline over 
time (relative to the contemporaneous performance of price-based systems). In early 
days of a collective, historical productivity may provide a reasonable basis for norm 
determination; as technology changes, it provides a less and less accurate basis. 
Moreover, in early days, there may be a cadre of ideologically committed individuals; 
these individuals may not need much economic incentive; as time progresses, the 
necessity of economic incentives may increase. 
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One possible method of obtaining some of the information that 
is critical to the determination of norms for different locations is to 
have private plots in the neighborhood of collectives. Another 
method is to set contests among collectives such that high perform- 
ers receive large rewards; whereas low performers receive significant 
punishment.22 Both of these methods may, however, be inconsistent 
with certain interpretations of socialist ideals. 
III. DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPACT OF PRICE SCISSORS WITHIN THE 
AGRICULTURAL SECTOR 
Our earlier representation that the agricultural sector consists 
of homogenous peasants is, of course, a simplifying assumption 
which, though allowing us to focus on the intersectoral aspects, 
obscures the intrasectoral consequences of changes in the terms of 
trade. These consequences have often been a source of controversy, 
and they depend not only on the income and land distribution 
within agriculture, but also on the induced effects of prices on 
variables such as the rural wage, migration, reallocation of land 
entailed by migration, the terms of sharecropping and credit, and 
the arrangements for sharing work and output within families. For 
brevity, we focus here on the induced effect on the rural wage but 
other induced effects can be analyzed similarly. 
The importance of the induced effects can be seen as follows. If 
there were no induced effects, then an increase in food price would 
hurt the net buyers of food (the landless and the farmers with small 
land holdings), and help the net sellers of food (large landlords, for 
example). Quite the reverse may be the case, as we shall see below, if 
the wage is highly responsive to the food price. 
The farm size of a person belonging to the rural group h is Ah. 
Qh is his surplus of agricultural good, which can be positive, 
negative, or zero. L1h is his net labor supply (that is, labor hours he 
supplies minus the labor hours employed on his farm). Thus, L1h is 
positive (negative) for the net suppliers (demanders) of labor. Also, 
Ah = 0, L1h > 0, and Q" < 0, for the landless. An individual's budget 
constraint is 
(20) pQh + wlLlh = ylh > 0, 
where w1(p) represents the rural wage per hour which, in general, 
would depend on the terms of trade. Let el = d In w1/d In p denote 
22. See Nalebuff and Stiglitz [1983], and Lazear and Rosen [1981] for analyses 
of contests. 
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the elasticity of the rural wage rate with respect to p. Then, using 
(20), we see that Roy's identity yields 
(21) d Vlh h iPQ + w L Mel 
dp P 
This can be rearranged as 
(22) =d V ih Xlh (pQh + wL Llh) + wlLlh (6 - 1) 
dp P 
The above expression, in combination with (20), yields the following 
results. 
PROPOSITION 7. A decrease in the terms of trade hurts (i) every 
rural individual, rich or poor, if the elasticity of the rural wage 
rate with respect to food price is close to one, (ii) the net sellers 
(demanders) of labor if the elasticity is significantly greater 
(smaller) than one.23 
Clearly, how large or small the elasticity of the rural wage rate 
is depends on the nature of the labor market and on the labor 
demand and supply responses of individuals. Here we consider the 
case in which there are constant returns to scale in agricultural 
production, and the rural wage rate is determined in a competitive 
rural labor market; that is, from 
(23) TN h(Lsh - AhLd) = 0, 
h 
where Nih is the number of individuals in the rural group h, 
Lsh(p, w1) is the labor supply of an individual in group h, and 
Ld ( p, W1) is the labor employed per unit land. Thus. L lh = Lsh 
AhLd is the net labor supply. 
Denote = -d in Ld/d in w1 and (d = (9 in Ld/la in p as 
elasticities of labor demanded on a unit land with respect to wage 
and price. If the wage rate equals the value of marginal product, 
23. It follows, therefore, that if the food-wage hypothesis (see footnote 10) holds 
in the rural sector, then, a lower term of trade hurts everyone, poor or rich. Further, 
suppose that we define a "self-sufficient" farmer to be the one who neither buys nor 
sells labor services; that is, Llh = 0. Then it is apparent from (20) and (22) that this 
farmer is worse-off if the terms of trade are lower. Categories such as self-sufficient 
farmers and marginal farmers (those who are not landless but are sufficiently poor) 
have often been used in policy formulations, particularly in India. It should be clear 
that the boundary lines of such categories, whether defined on the basis of net trade 
of labor or goods, or on the basis of a given level of welfare (real income), are 
themselves dependent on wages and prices. 
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then the labor demand depends only on the ratio of the wage and 
output price. Therefore, cdw = e d. Next, define cs' = ( In Lsh/I( in w1, 
and shp = -a in Lsh/O in p as elasticities of the labor supply, by an 
individual belonging to group h, with respect to wage and price. A 
perturbation in (23) then yields 
(24) p -1 = L LW) NTN L w + ALdeiW). 
Substitution of the above into (22) makes it possible to express an 
individual's gain or loss from a change in the terms of trade solely in 
terms of the behavioral parameters that, in principle, can be 
estimated. 
Next, note that the right-hand side of (24) is zero either if Lsh is 
fixed, or if (s = cs It is easily verified that the latter happens if the 
individual's labor supply depends on the food price and on the 
wage, but not on the price of the industrial good. In both cases, it is 
obvious that the net labor supply of an individual (and hence of the 
entire agricultural sector) depends only on the ratio of the wage and 
the output price. Combining expressions (22) and (24), we find the 
following. 
PROPOSITION 8. A decrease in the terms of trade hurts every rural 
individual if the rural wage rate equals the value of marginal 
product and if (i) individuals' labor supplies are fixed, or if (ii) 
the elasticities of an individual's labor supply with respect to 
wage and price are close to one another.24 
Optimal Prices. Our earlier analysis of the optimal terms of 
trade is easily extended to the present context of heterogeneous 
rural individuals. If the social welfare in the rural sector is repre- 
sented as 2h Nlh W1(Vlh), then (16) continues to describe the 
optimal terms of trade, where 
d13=1E1N MO PQ + w1L p) / N1Q, 
Q = 1h Nlh Qh/Nl is the average surplus per agricultural individual, 
and El is given by (24). That is, the "average" social weight to be 
attached to the gains of the rural sector is a weighted average of the 
24. This result holds even if the wage rate does not equal the value of marginal 
product, as long as the labor demand depends only on wO/p; that is, it is homogeneous 
of degree zero in the wage rate and the price. 
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marginal social utilities of incomes of different rural individuals, 
where the weights take into account the induced wage effects.25 
IV. PARETO-IMPROVING PRICE REFORMS FOR CASH CROPS AND 
AGRICULTURAL INPUTS 
The simplifying assumption that a single (aggregate) good is 
produced in each of the two sectors underlies the long-standing 
questions concerning the terms of trade between agriculture and 
industry, on which we have focused above. Our analysis, however, 
can be easily extended to incorporate a multitude of goods by 
interpreting Q. x's, p, and P as vectors. In fact, such a generalization 
is essential to shed light on such questions as whether fertilizers 
should be subsidized and tractors taxed or, more generally, how 
should the taxes and subsidies on various agriculture inputs and 
outputs be set? These questions are of ongoing concern and contro- 
versies in many LDCs. 
The effect of a change in the price of the ith good on a rural 
individual belonging to group h is given by Roy's identity, 
(25) = A Qi + L ) 
dp. dpi 
where Q' is this individual's surplus of good i. As is obvious, 
expression (25) is a straightforward generalization of (21). The 
effects on the welfare of industrial workers and on the investable 
surplus can also be easily assessed, and using these, one can 
characterize the optimal prices. Rather than focusing on the analy- 
sis of such an optimum (the implementation of which requires 
knowing, among other things, the distribution of income within 
each sector, the social weights corresponding to different groups of 
individuals, the own- and cross-elasticities of the consumption 
quantities with respect to prices, and the elasticities of the urban 
and rural wages with respect to various prices), we present here a 
novel, and more useful, result that shows how Pareto-improving 
price reforms can be conducted for certain goods on the basis of 
relatively limited information. 
25. The induced wage effects emphasized in this paper are typically absent in 
the standard tax models (see Atkinson and Stiglitz [1980], for a review) which 
assume that the general equilibrium effects are insignificant, or that the government 
can tax wages. Neither assumption is satisfactory in the context of the agricultural 
sector of an LDC. 
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Consider those agricultural inputs and outputs that are not 
consumed, such as fertilizers, pesticides, agricultural machinery, 
and various cash crops. For brevity, we refer to these goods as 
"production goods." Clearly, a change in the prices of these goods 
does not affect urban individuals, and it affects the consumption 
and the labor supply of rural individuals only through their full 
income and through the induced changes in the rural wage. If the 
jth good is a production good, and z is the vector of inputs and 
outputs on unit land, then Qh = A'z1, where inputs (outputs) are 
represented as negative (positive) quantities. 
We consider here the case in which the rural wage is deter- 
mined in a competitive labor market, and assume that all produc- 
tion goods have the same (but not constant) elasticity with respect 
to wage.26 That is, 
(26) a =lZj9 
owl 
where the parameter g, (as well as g and B, which will be used below) 
are defined in Appendix I, but they are irrelevant for the main 
result to be derived in this section. Using (26), we show in Appendix 
I that 
dw' (27) dp = gz 
dpj. 
That is, the change in the rural wage due to a change in the price of a 
production good is proportional to the quantity of this production 
good on unit land. This result holds regardless of the nature of 
individuals' labor supply and demand responses. Obviously, g = 0 if 
the induced wage effects are negligible; in this case, the assumption 




where si = (pi - Pi)/pi represents the rates of taxes of subsidies, and 
cji = a In z/da In pi represents price elasticities of inputs and outputs 
per unit of land. Thus, (28) represents the proportional change (due 
to taxation) in the quantity (on unit land) of the production good i. 
26. This happens if the unit (land) profit function is separable between the 
price of production goods and other prices; see the Appendix. For details on the 
underlying production technologies, see Lau [1978]. 
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Using (7), (27), and (28), we show in the Appendix that 
dI (29) d = (c. + B)Az1, dp p
which provides a basis for the following price reforms. 
Consider two production goods, I and k. If their prices are 
changed by Azp3 and - (zjlzk) Ap1, respectively, then it follows from 
(25) and (27) that the welfare of every rural individual remains 
unchanged. The resulting change in investment is obtained from 
(29) as 
(30) \I= (c- - ck)Az-I\pj. 
The rules for price reforms follow immediately. Calculate cj's for all 
of the production goods. If c > Ck, and I and k are both outputs 
(inputs), then increase (decrease) the price of the jth good by a 
small amount, say Ap1, and decrease (increase) the price of the kth 
good by (ZJ/Zk) Ap1. Parallel rules apply if the jth good is an output 
(input) and the kth good is an input (output). The above reforms 
lead to an unambiguous increase in the investable surplus, without 
affecting the welfare of any individual. Therefore, 
PROPOSITION 9. The above rules of reform are Pareto improving. 
The required information to use these rules consists solely of 
the current taxes on inputs and outputs, current quantities of 
inputs and outputs on unit land, and the response of these 
quantities to the changes in the prices of production goods. 
Moreover, as should be obvious, our rules of reform take into 
account the induced effects of price changes on the rural wage, 
albeit under the assumption (26) which restricts the nature of these 
effects. If this assumption appears too restrictive, then the relevant 
empirical question is, how different are the observed induced wage 
effects from those with the above restriction. If the differences are 
not significant, then our rules of reform can be employed with 
significant parsimony in information. 
Furthermore, it is obvious from (30) that a necessary condition 
for the optimality of prices is that cj's should be equal for all 
production goods. That is, the proportional reduction due to taxa- 
tion in the quantities of different production goods (on unit land) 
should be equal. This has an interesting implication. Assume, for a 
moment, that changes in the prices of production goods have 
negligible cross-price effects on the quantities of inputs and outputs 
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(that is, Ejy =0 if i # I). Then, from (28), slyjj is the same for all I. 
Next, from the standard properties of profit functions, Ejj > 0 for an 
output, and yjj < 0 for an input. Also, from our definition of sj, a 
positive (negative) sj implies a tax (subsidy) on an input and a 
subsidy (tax) on an output. It follows then that either all of the 
production goods (inputs as well as outputs) should be taxed or all 
of them should be subsidized. 
This last result is important not because we believe that the 
cross-price effects are negligible. They are important because they 
cast doubts on an oft given advice that, on the grounds of equity, 
some agricultural inputs (like tractors) should be taxed, since they 
are used primarily by rich farmers, while other inputs (like fertil- 
izer) should be subsidized, since they are used by poor as well as rich 
farmers.27 
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
A central reason why the terms of trade has received so much 
attention in the context of intersectoral transfer of resources and 
accumulation is that an attempt to alter the terms of trade merely 
requires the government to change the nominal price of the indus- 
trial goods. Such changes are more feasible, given the extensive 
ownership and control that the governments of many developing 
countries exercise over the industrial sector, than implementing 
virtually any other policy instrument. This was true in the early 
Soviet state, and it is true in most of today's LDCs, socialist or not. 
This is why we have focused in this paper on the terms of trade. 
We should emphasize, however, that LDC governments do 
employ a range of additional policy instruments depending in part 
27. The assumption of constant returns to scale in agricultural production, 
which underlies the preceding analysis, has been repeatedly tested and validated by 
microeconometric work (see Strauss [1986] for a recent test). Yet an empirical 
implication of this assumption, which may not always be satisfied by actual 
observations, is that there are no systematic variations in factor proportions across 
farmers with different farm sizes. But even if systematic variations in factor 
proportions are observed, they need not be a consequence of nonhomotheticity of 
technology (instead, they could result from particular types of heterogeneity of land 
across farmers, or from unequal access of different individuals to capital and rental 
markets), nor does the presence of such variations imply that the subsidization of 
some production goods and taxation of other production goods is useful on the 
grounds of equity (see Sah and Stiglitz [1987] for further analysis). A quite different 
set of arguments for fertilizer/tractor/seed subsidies from which our analysis has 
abstracted is that these subsidies might encourage adoption of new techniques. But 
the relevant question in this case is whether input subsidies are the appropriate 
instruments to encourage new techniques, or methods such as provision of usable 
information to farmers are socially more profitable. 
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on the ability of their fiscal bureaucracies, and on the informational 
and administrative costs of alternative instruments. In some cases, 
but not always, the analysis of pricing policy is significantly affected 
by the set of instruments that the government can or cannot 
employ. An important example is when the government can admin- 
ister two different sets of prices in the two sectors (for which it 
needs to have the ability to monitor, at reasonable administrative 
costs, the movement of goods across sectors); in this case, a change 
in the prices of goods in one sector does not have a direct effect on 
individuals in the other sector.28 
Though we have emphasized in this paper the diversity across 
different economies concerning some institutional features, such as 
the external trade environment and the wage determination mecha- 
nism, we have abstracted from many other institutional features. 
Among the important omissions are aspects such as migration of 
factors across sectors,29 and the arrangements of land tenure, credit 
and intra-household sharing within agriculture. In the sequels to 
the present paper, we have not only incorporated these institutional 
features, but have also investigated pricing policies when the set of 
instruments that the government can employ is wider than that 
emphasized in this paper.30 
We have not pursued in this paper some of the important uses 
to which an analysis such as the present one can be put. For 
instance, governments often justify the particular policies that they 
pursue with egalitarian rhetoric. It- is important, then, to examine 
whether significant redistribution from the rich to the poor is 
possible at all through the set of policy instruments that a govern- 
ment is constrained to employ (or which it chooses to employ).31 Our 
model can also be used (with reasonable values of parameters 
representing the economy) to identify whether or not the existing 
policies in a country are consistent with an egalitarian social welfare 
function. We conjecture that at least in many cases (particularly in 
those widely prevalent cases in which the government "appears" to 
subsidize everyone) important inconsistencies will be detected. 
Whether identifying such inconsistencies is more likely to affect the 
policy, or the rhetoric, is a moot question. 
28. See Sah and Stiglitz [1985c] for the corresponding analysis. 
29. Endogenous population migration can be significant not only in the third 
world LDCs but also in socialist economies, as has been pointed out by Ellman [1979, 
p. 94]. 
30. See Sah and Stiglitz [1987] for an overview. 
31. Sah [1983] has shown that there are serious limitations on the possibilities 
of redistribution through commodity taxation and pricing. 
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APPENDIX 
Denote the unit profit function as G = G(G'(p',w'), 
G2(p2)) = pz - wiLd, where p2 is the vector of production goods' 
prices. Then, for the production good j, azjl/wl = a-Ld! Opj = gizp 
where 
l2G . aG a/G 
g1 = ca2 O~Ia glaGlaG2 awl aG 2 
Therefore, the elasticity d in zj/O in w1 = g1w' is the same for all j. 
The labor market clearing condition is ThNlhLlh(psWl) = 0, 
which, upon differentiation, gives 
dw 'I OL lh ____h 
dNh Op ) Nih w1 
Next, the prices of production goods affect the labor supply only 
through the full income, mlh = wiLh + AhG, where Lh is the endow- 
ment of labor. Thus, 
OLlh AhzjOLsh A hOLd 
Op1 Orlh p apj am j 
Now, recall that - OLd/Op1 = g1zj. It follows that dwl/dpj = gzj, 
where 
g = -EZ NihAh( L d Ih) Nih dlih 
h~~~10 hjL Ow 
Using the last expression and the symmetry property 
azil/pj = Ozjl/pi, we can express the derivative of (7) as (29), where 
B -1 + (p-P) Q Aml h dwlA 
and xlh is the consumption vector for person h. Further, g = 0 if 
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